Pakistan’s nuclear Programme

By: Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Islamabad’s transparent policy about its NCA, SPD, PNRA, NEMS and SECDIV; its practical initiatives to carryout international obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540, CSI and GICNT; its relative openness in explaining its command and control structures that goes beyond the practice adopted by other nuclear capable states; its commendable Export Control Act 2004; its constructive participation in the three Nuclear Security Summits; and establishment a state-of-the-art Centre of Excellence vindicate that Pakistan’s Nuclear Security is unquestionable.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme has prejudicially been portrayed in the international media since 1970s. Ironically, many security analysts deliberately conceal the reality and twist the facts to generate sensation about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The anti-Pakistan nuclear programme lobby, especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, has been frequently pronouncing detrimental judgments against the safety and security of the programme in both print and electronic media. Its primary objective is to persuade the international community about the inability of the Pakistani nuclear establishment to protect its nuclear infrastructure from the transnational terrorist groups. Instead of critically examining the safety and security apparatus of country’s nuclear facilities, nuclear arsenal and nuclear related institutional arrangements for the sake of objective analysis; the anti-Pakistan lobby is merely relying on the baseless concocted stories and fictitious hypothesis. Without realizing that a nation which develops its indigenous nuclear fuel cycle and successfully manufactures and tests nuclear weapons is capable enough to secure its nuclear facilities and arsenal from terrorist groups’ attacks as well as from external powers’ incursions into the country’s nuclear weapons’ locations. Though this subjective maligning campaign has failed to cap the progressive trajectory of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, yet it has fashioned negative caveats about the country’s nuclear infrastructures’ safety and security.

The nature of subjective criticism; conspiracy theories hatched against Pakistan’s nuclear civil and military programmes; and above all the fear of nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks necessitate serious analysis of the subject, i.e. safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It seems appropriate to critically examine the measures that Pakistani nuclear establishment has taken over the past more than one decade to ensure safety and security of its nuclear assets. Therefore, the following discussion is an attempt to present briefly the realistic-cum-objective account of the puzzle to keep the record straight. Indeed, the following deliberation on Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security programme would be useful to provide an overview of Pakistan’s efforts in the field of nuclear security that have been recognized by the international community and various international agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – a global nuclear watchdog that looks after issues related to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

Importantly, the Pakistani nuclear establishment has institutionalized highly secured systems, which have been improved gradually to thwart internal and external security challenges to its nuclear infrastructure and arsenal since the very beginning of the nuclear weapon programme. Immediately, after the nuclear weapons’ tests in May 1998, the Government of Pakistan announced its National Command Authority (NCA) which comprises the Employment Control Committee, the Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) — the secretariat of the Authority. The periodic meetings of the NCA, and briefings organized by the SPD reveal that a range of overt and covert measures were adopted to guard country’s nuclear programme. A few of explicit measures are spelled out in the following paragraphs.

First, the nuclear assets — both civilian and military — safety and security are ensured by the NCA through its secretariat, SPD. Notably, the SPD works on behalf of the NCA, which increases its role in the nuclear decision-making. It is headed by a serving Lt General of Pakistan Army — Director General of SPD — who is the focal person to ensure the safety and security of both civilian and military components of the country’s nuclear programme. Precisely, the SPD is a custodian of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In addition, separate strategic forces commands have been raised in all the three services. The services retain training, technical and administrative control over their strategic forces. These arrangements institutionalized the safety and security mechanism of the country’s nuclear weapons.

Second, the custodian’s of the weapon programme had established a ‘Security Division’ that today has more than 25,000 trained personnel at its disposal to guard the nuclear assets. The division is solely responsible for the security of all nuclear assets in Pakistan, and has specially trained combat troops to handle various kinds of contingencies. It also has its own academy to provide specialized training to the newly inducted troops. These trained soldiers are far superior to terrorists and certainly capable to guard both nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear facilities from terrorists’ attempt and external powers’ incursions into the nuclear weapons’ locations. Thus, presently, Pakistan has not only a robust command and control system in place; but also has trained personnel to protect its nuclear assets from diversion, theft and accidental misuse.

Third, the NCA decided that nuclear weapons would not be stored at one place and very few people know about their exact locations. One can count these people on fingers who exactly know about the location of nuclear arsenals. The SPD introduced a very rigorous vetting process for the nuclear establishment, i.e. personal reliability programme for military personals and human reliability programme for the civilians as well as scientists to prevent insiders’ link with the terrorist groups. The officers, who are trusted with the weapons’ location information, ought to be under continuous surveillance by the intelligence agency, which is directly reporting to the high-ups of the secretariat. This methodology, certainly, conceals the locations of the nuclear arsenals and also ensures the integrity of the employs.

Fourth, the critics of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals safety apparatus have failed to comprehend that the country’s nukes are not maintained on a hair-trigger alert. Thereby, in times of peace its nuclear warheads are maintained separately from their non-nuclear assemblies. This approach prevents accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the SPD has developed a fool proof security system such as Permissive Action Link System that is modeled on one used by the United States nuclear establishment. The Permissive Action Link electronically locks nuclear weapons. The SPD also relies on a range of other measures including dual-key system. To prevent any possibility of inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, physical safety mechanisms and firewalls have been developed in the weapon systems themselves and in the chain of command. No single individual can operate a weapon system, nor can one individual issue the command for nuclear weapons use. The evolution of the NCA ensures that no unauthorized use of nuclear weapons could ever take place, yet the weapon can be operationally ready on short notice.

Fifth, Pakistan’s Parliament Legislated an Act in September 2004 – the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act. It was a practical attempt by the government of Pakistan to fulfil international obligations envisaged by the UNSC Resolution 1540 in April 2004. The purpose of the Export Control Act was to further strengthen controls on the export of sensitive technologies, particularly related to nuclear and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Pakistan also established a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2007. The purpose of the SECDIV is to further tighten controls over exports, by monitoring and implementing the Export Control Act of 2004.

Sixth, to prevent the possibility of theft and sabotage during the transportation of sensitive nuclear materials, effective measures have been instituted to fulfil international obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540. Along with other measures taken in this regard, it has been ensured that specialist vehicles and tamper proof containers are provided for transit of nuclear materials, and escorted by military personnel. It was reported that as part of its international obligations, Pakistan has submitted four reports pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1540, providing details of its national legislative measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons or related material, till the writing of these lines.

Seventh, Islamabad is very attentive and actively participating in the international arrangements to prevent nuclear/radiological terrorism. For instance, Pakistan was amongst the very first countries that submitted a report to the United Nations to fulfil its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540. It joined US sponsored Container Security Initiative (CSI) in March 2006 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in 2007. In addition, Pakistan is also part of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process – an initiative by President Obama that had led to three successful Nuclear Security Summits in 2010, 2012, and 2014 held at Washington D.C. Seoul, and The Hague, respectively. Pakistan participated in these three Summits at the Prime Minister level and made significant contributions in support of the global efforts towards nuclear safety and security. Eighth, Islamabad has established a state-of-the-art Centre of Excellence that provides specialized courses in nuclear security, physical protection, material control and accounting, transport security and personnel reliability. The Center of Excellence acts as a regional and international hub to train the people. Pakistan also deployed Special Nuclear Material Portals on key exit and entry points to counter the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. During the Nuclear Security Summits, Pakistan also called attention to its endeavours to cooperate with other states to improve their nuclear safety and security system.

Ninth, since 2001, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has been guarantying physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, nuclear material control and accounting, transport security, border controls, the prevention of illicit trafficking and radiological emergencies. Tenth, the Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) has been established by the government to deal with all nuclear and radiological emergencies. For instance, “dedicated Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) and Special Response Forces (SRF) equipped with the latest equipment and technology, including airborne assets, to handle various nuclear safety and security contingencies.”

The national consensus on Pakistan’s nuclear programme and the institutionalized structure of the NCA and its secretariat constituted vigilant custodians of the country’s nuclear programme. The physical-protection apparatus and custodial safeguards’ arrangements make Pakistani nuclear assets both civilian and military inaccessible to the unauthorized outsiders. Consequently, there has been no recorded incident of the sabotage or theft of the Pakistani nuclear material to-date. On March 23, 2015, Lt. General (retired) Khalid Kidwai, the former Director General of SPD stated categorically at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 (CINPC 2015) held at Washington D.C United States that: “I would like to conclude by holding out an assurance to this audience on something I know worries the international community all the time: the safety and security of Pakistani nuclear weapons in the disturbed security environment of our region. For the last 15 years Pakistan has taken its nuclear security obligations seriously. We understand the consequences of complacency, there is no complacency. We have invested heavily in terms of money, manpower, equipment, weapons, training, preparedness and smart site security solutions.” He added, “I say with full responsibility that nuclear security in Pakistan is a non-issue. You have all your national tactical means to verify, but you might also take my solemn words for it. Our nuclear weapons are safe, secure and under complete institutional and professional control.” Notably, during the question and answer session not even a single participant in CINPC 2015 conference asked a question to General Kidwai related to Pakistan’s nuclear security. This verifies that informed international community has confidence in Pakistan’s nuclear security apparatus.

To conclude, Islamabad’s transparent policy about its NCA, SPD, PNRA, NEMS and SECDIV; its practical initiatives to carryout international obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540, CSI and GICNT; its relative openness in explaining its command and control structures that goes beyond the practice adopted by other nuclear capable states; its commendable Export Control Act 2004; its constructive participation in the three Nuclear Security Summits; and establishment a state-of-the-art Centre of Excellence vindicate that Pakistan’s Nuclear Security is unquestionable.

The writer is Director and Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He contributes for print and electronic media regularly.

znjaspal@qau.edu.pk

India’s nuclear record

By Anaya Shahid

In a recent article “Dangers of Rehabilitating a Nuclear Pakistan,” Sitakanta Mishra contended that Pakistan committed a suicide a few decades ago by its involvement in nuclear proliferation. He failed to recognize that Pakistan not involved as a State. Mishra is of the view that now Pakistan will never be treated as “Normal State” in nuclear arena because of its flawed nuclear proliferation record. He exaggerated India’s ‘absolutely impeccable record’ on nuclear non-proliferation.

A thorough examination of India’s nuclear proliferation record gives a not-so-impeccable picture. India introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia by illegally siphoning off nuclear material provided by Canada and the U.S. for peaceful purposes only. India used Canadian provided technical expertise and financing to make nuclear weapons.  This was the first proliferation done by any country in South Asia and about ten NPT signatories were involved in it. The U.S. provided heavy water for CIRUS reactor from which India stole material for making plutonium to test its first nuclear bomb in 1974.

Former Chairmen Dr. Y. S. R. Prasad and Shri Ch. Surendar of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) were both sanctioned by the United States on September 23, 2004. They violated the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 by transferring equipment to Iran and technology of proliferation significance since January 1, 1999 and were sanctioned by the U.S. in November 1998 for being “involved in nuclear or missile activities.”

Similarly two other companies were sanctioned on transferring technologies used in the making of weapons of mass destruction to Iran. Which were PDIL owned by government of India undertaking under department of fertilizers and Rallis India owned by Tata Chemicals Limited a private multinational company. Now India is finding a deceitful cover by saying that these companies were not state owned. In reality, these companies are state owned and it simply shows that India was involved in nuclear proliferation. Interestingly, the Indian sympathizers find it hard to believe that India has proliferated.

In April 2003, diplomatic snubs between India and the U.S. spiked because New Delhi was annoyed over Washington for the CIA released an unclassified report to Congress about India’s illegal nuclear trade with Libya. Moreover, the CIA named India for financing in a Libyan missile program. Therefore, India was quite upset on CIA report that alleged her for helping Libya with its missile program.

In 1989, Wisconsin Law School professor Gary Milhollin was of the view that once India exploded an atomic bomb in 1974, the world was shocked. India had taken imported technologies that were under guarantees of peaceful use and used them openly to make plutonium for a nuclear blast. That blast destroyed illusions about the “peaceful atom” and prompted changes in nuclear export policy. It is not surprising that India has again taken advantage of civilian imports and technology to further what appears to be a nuclear weapons program. What is surprising is that, given India’s record, it was so easy.

Nowadays policies of major powers, including U.S., are seem to downplay India’s flawed nonproliferation record.  India was extensively involved in leaking sensitive centrifuge design information, illicitly procured goods for its nuclear weapons programs, and never thrived to adequately enforced export controls. Whereas West is making a broad effort for mainstreaming of nuclear India, which will Increase India’s access to dual-use technology. Point to ponder is that if Indian government failed to fix above mentioned acts then it will increase the probability that some of this technology could leak out through its poorly implemented controls.

Indians also attempted to obtain prohibited items for its gas centrifuge program. The tactic which India using deliberately is to vend tenders to companies that then procure the items. David Albright, who is the founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security, implied that the Indian government doesn’t ask too many questions. He found that India has a website where you can search the tenders. Go ahead and peruse the 297 tenders’ from the Department Of Atomic Energy, including one for Anhydrous Ammonia—essential to any well stocked meth lab.

It infers that in 1980s, India used many of the same front companies as cover to illicit nuclear trade, including Trade Fin in South Africa. In reality, India have nurtured some centrifuge design information back into the illicit networks involved in nuclear black market in developing specifications for feed and piping systems. Although India is following an export control list, India does not sufficiently enforce export controls.

It is a fact that India has blemished and detailed record of developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles under the pretext of peaceful nuclear and space cooperation. India had a considered policy in 1980s of crushing international controls by trafficking heavy water from the USSR, China and Norway, which permitted India to use its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. Similarly, India built its largest nuclear-capable missile, the Agni, by importing technological parts from NASA including the design of an American space launcher, again for superficially peaceful purposes. Even today, Indian missile and nuclear sites continue to import sensitive American equipment in violation of U.S. law.

Treaty of Amritsar, Tragedy of 19th Century

By Tariq Rizwan

A treaty was signed on 16 March 1846 between the British East India Company and Gulab Singh Dogra after the First Anglo-Sikh War to decide the future of serene kashmir Valley and its Muslim population. This is called “The Treaty of Amritsar”. Earlier, arrangements were made in the Treaty of Lahore . Gulab Singh acquired "all the hilly or mountainous state along with its dependencies, eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba. While Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government. G. Singh was to pay 75 lakhs (7.5 million) of Nanak Shahi rupees (the ruling currency of the Sikh Empire) to the British Government apart from other annual tributes. It was the beginning of Dogra rule in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, payment of 15 million of rupees (nanakshahi currency); and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment; the Maharaja ceded to the Honorable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for 10 million rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara.

In consideration of the services rendered by Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu to the Lahore State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Government, the Maharaja agreed to recognize the independent sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh, in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to Raja Gulab Singh by separate agreement between him and the British Government, with the dependencies, thereof, which may have been in the Raja’s possession since the time of the late Maharaja Kharrak Singh; and the British Government, in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Gulab Singh, also agreed to recognize his independence in such territories and admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British Government. Treaty between the British Government on the one part and Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu on the other concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Harding, G.C.B., one of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Governor-General of the possessions of the East India Company, to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies and by Maharaja Gulab Singh in person.

The British Government transferred independent possession, to Maharaja Gulab Singh and heirs male of his family, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies situated to the Eastward of the river, Indus and Westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahol, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore dated 9th March 1846 A.D.

ARTICLE II The Eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing Article to Maharaja Gulab Singh shall be laid down by commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively for that purpose and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey. ARTICLE III In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing Articles, Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy five Lakhs of rupees (Nanakshahi), fifty Lakhs to be paid on ratification of this treaty and twenty-five Lakhs on or before the 1st October of the current year, 1846 A.D. ARTICLE IV The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government. ARTICLE V Maharaja Gulab Singh will refer to the Arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between him and the Government of the Lahore or any other neighboring State and will abide by the decision of the British Government.

Article VI Maharaja Gulab Singh engages for himself and his heirs to join with the whole of his military forces, the British troops when employed in the hills or in the territories adjoining his possessions. ARTICLE VII Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject nor the subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British Government. ARTICLE VIII Maharaja Gulab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of the Articles, V, VI, VII of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Darbar, dated 11th March, 1846 A.D. ARTICLE IX The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies. ARTICLE X Maharaja Gulab Singh Acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls. This Treaty consisting of the above Articles has been this day settled by Frederic Currie Esq. and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Harding, and by maharaja Gulab Singh in person and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Harding, G.C.B., Governor General.

Done at Amritsar on 16 March, 1846, corresponding with the seventeenth day Rabi-ul-Awal 1264 Hijri, the treaty handed over Jammu & Kashmir to an individual family. In 1947, Gulab Singh handed over the Kashmiris to the new born India without consulting the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmiris are suffering heavily due to presence of 0.7 million security forces converting the serene valley into a battlefield. There is no freedom of action and speech despite UN Resolutions supporting right of self determination for the people of Jammu & Kashmir.  The treaty is violation of present day democratic world order and stake holders need to be pressed for its ultimate solution.

The writer is a freelance journalist based at London.

Nuclear threat initiative index 2016 – Challenges and opportunities

By Huma Rehman

In post 9/11 scenario concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and terrorism became serious matter for global policy makers. States cognizant of the emerging challenges took steps to strengthen nuclear security regime. Nuclear security is defined as the prevention and detection of, and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. It covers both security and safety aspects to maintain nuclear security culture. In regard to states possessing nuclear weapons use-able materials, being sovereign states, pledged to implement a nuclear security regime. It comprises abiding by tangible and intangible factors including confidentiality of information to physical protection. Because it is a national responsibility of a state and the principal shared objective is to limit the fallout resulting from any accident related to radioactive material and associated facilities.

US President Obama, addressing the world from Prague, in 2009 termed nuclear terrorism one of the greatest threats to international security. He announced the initiative of Nuclear Security Summit process. It also led to another project named the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) index. It is an effort for controlling global nuclear terrorism threats  by indexing nuclear material possessing states. It may consider an opportunity for the establishment of a culture that will emphasize responsibility and accountability among individuals involved in the management and protection of nuclear facilities and material at every stage of the organizational hierarchy, hence contributes to the security and safety of nuclear materials. But it has some technical loopholes which raise concerns for some states in complex regional security environment.

NTI Assessment

The strengths of NTI index include an idea for assessing nuclear safety and security parameters adopted by states around the world. But this objective requires common principles, assessing states, rigorous and prudent approaches, and effective communication and open, two way communications.

The layout, approach, standards and methodology of NTI Index are designed in such a manner that it serves the interests of developed states. On account of geographical and domestic considerations they enjoy a stable political situation. They continue to maintain a secure regional environment. It thus, is reflected in the higher score of the western states in the NTI Index in comparison to turbulent developing countries and their complex regional environment.

These considerations of regional complexities require attention for progress and success of initiatives such as NTI to achieve its greater goal of global nuclear security.  Because with this pattern of NTI Index it deflects focus from the significant matters of quality, safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials and adherence to the various nuclear safety and security norms. By assessing existing methodology of NTI, it appears to justify certain goals or expecting specific outcomes.

NTI Process

The NTI Index report lists and evaluates states possessing nuclear weapons use-able materials. The identified criteria by NTI categorize; quantities and sites of nuclear materials, security and control measures, global norms, domestic commitments and capacity, societal factors and sabotage ranking. Sabotage Ranking has been included in this recent third document of 2016 NTI index.

Quantitative measuring of the regulations and practices being followed by various states is a difficult task. It hence, becomes a limitation of the Index. There is paucity of publically available data, due to the sensitivity surrounding the security and safety practices of state parties. Thus, any ranking is bound to be a limited assessment of the national nuclear safety and security practices.

In terms of contribution made by the NTI is a new category of potential threats emerging from cyber sabotage. Addressing these threats will enhance nuclear security. A new “sabotage ranking” of 45 countries with certain types of nuclear facilities shows that many countries considering nuclear power plants are struggling to establish the basic measures necessary to prevent an act of sabotage that could result in a radiological release similar in scale to the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan.

Pakistan and NTI 

While assessing steps taken by Pakistan, the recent NTI Index mentioned country’s new cyber security regulations initiative but on the other hand its score still lies in bottom line. This point should be considered by NTI as defined in its index calculus.  The NTI Report also highlighted that Pakistan is improving it nuclear security ranging from on-site physical protection to new laws and regulations requiring licensees to provide physical protection to nuclear sites and on-site reviews of security. It has an excellent record of not having a single incident of nuclear facility or radiological material’s theft reported so far which is great achievement for a nuclear weapon state. Pakistan’s national organizations responsible for nuclear security and safety are confident not complacent. Pakistan will ensure its commitment to further improve its ranking in future.

Conclusion

It is significant to refer that nuclear security is exclusively the sovereign right of a state; but collective and mutually agreed steps by states to guarantee safety and security against the existing global threats is dire need of hour. In regard to enhance the efficacy of NTI, considerations of efforts taken by states to enhance nuclear safety and security parameters, regional security complexity and sensitivity of states regional environment are important elements to count on for indexing states.  In this way, it will also help to promote other initiatives, including Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. In general, the NSS is a process; it should not be expected to turn into a legal binding mechanism because of its political aspects. But the global community must seek viable options for an effective and accountable global system for how nuclear materials should be secured to protect the world from dangers of nuclear terrorism; indeed it is a shared responsibility. The current global nuclear security system still has some critical gaps to be filled that prevent it from being truly comprehensive and effective.

India to Strengthen Illegal Control on Kashmir

By Sajjad Shaukat

Since the leader of the BJP and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi came to power, as part of anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan approach, he has been giving impetus to Hindu chauvinism. In line of his policy against Pakistan, India not only accelerated unprovoked firing at the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and Working Boundary in Sialkot, but also suspended the Secretary level talks with Islamabad. In the recent past, Modi regime has been raising baseless issue like Pathonkot terror attack, (which was orchestrated by India), Mumbai mayhem and terrorism as pre-conditions to advance the Pak-Indian dialogue. But, he ignored the fact that on July 19, 2013, the Indian ex-investigating officer Satish Verma disclosed that terror-attacks in Mumbai in November 26, 2008 and assault on Indian Parliament in January 12, 2001 were carried out by the Indian government to strengthen anti-terrorism laws.

However, Modi regime has taken various steps to strengthen Indian illegal control on Kashmir. In this regard, depending upon state terrorism, the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Modi, on January 27, this year gave its approval for raising 17 Reserve Police Battalions (IRBPs) in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as well as states affected by Left-wing extremism.

Indian home ministry said that of the total India Reserve Battalions (IRF), five will be in Jammu and Kashmir, four in Chhattisgarh, three each in Jharkhand and Odisha and the remaining two in Maharashtra. In Jammu and Kashmir, 60 per cent of the recruits will be from border districts. The ministry elaborated, “For these battalions, local youths will be recruited and to achieve this, the states will relax the age and educational criteria, if required.” It further said that the cost of raising each of the battalion will be around Indian Rupee, 61 crore and 75 percent of it will be provided by the Central Government.

Within a span of approximately six months, Central Government of India has approved the demand which reflects the surge of militants/insurgent activities in various regions of India, particularly in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). It also highlights the manifestation of focus to curb militancy and raise the force level to meet the challenges, which have been repeatedly expressed by Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.

Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh has also repeatedly highlighted his focus to build the capacity of security forces engaged in fighting insurgency. The mentioned increase is a part of overall drive against Naxal/Maoist hit states and especially IOK.

It is notable that Modi regime hurriedly decided to forcibly annex disputed territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, uncovering its intentions to wrap up the article 370 of the Indian constitution which ensures a special status to J&K. Therefore, United Nations Military Observer Group India and Pakistan in New Delhi was asked to vacate official accommodation. In fact, BJP government‘s long term strategy is to affect demographic changes in the Indian occupied Kashmir by composition of the region—predominately with Hindu population.

During one year of People’s Democratic Party (PDP)-BJP alliance government in the Indian Occupied Kashmir, BJP in aid of RSS has furthered its agenda of complete integration of Kashmir into India. Though legal experts of India and IOK High Court have clarified the permanent status of Article 370 of Indian Constitution, BJP’s agenda of trifurcations is still on table. In this context, BJP is in hot pursuit of Mission 44+in IOK Assembly elections 2020. However, short of that, BJP and RSS are busy in changing religious identity of the State. For example, special concessions were given to expand the horizon of Amarnath Yatra to project that Hindus have greater stakes in IOK than Muslims.

Special efforts are being made for demographic engineering in the State. For instance, West Pakistan Refugees have been recruited in the Indian Armed Forces from IOK quota. Allocation of lands for separate cities for repatriating Hindu Pundits and allocation of INR 2 million for rehabilitation of each Pundit family in the Valley are aimed at creating Hindu constituencies in a thorough Muslim region of the Valley through delimitations.

On the other hand, the sectors of health, education, local infrastructure, social support and rural development are being controlled by BJP MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly). Major projects of the State are being announced and are implemented in Hindu dominant-BJP constituencies to give a message that only BJP’s voters are entitled to a standard living. Through these tactics, BJP is longing for Mission 44+ in next IOK Assembly elections.

Kashmiri Hurriyat leadership has been suppressed by the PDP-BJP government by not allowing them to organize rallies for demanding freedom and expressing love for Pakistan. Their leaders were detained in Police Stations or kept under house arrests during all important events. Detention of Masarat Alam, even after acceptance of bail by IOK High Court, exhibits coercive mechanics of Indian forces/police in the State.

Indian malicious intent is evident from the blame game against Pakistan for every internal security issue, merely to avoid serious dialogue on bilateral issues as well as the humanitarian crisis in Kashmir. Pakistan is committed to the just and democratic solution of the Kashmir issue, which is plebiscite, however, India has never been serious in resolution of the dispute, neither through bilateral dialogue nor involving third party mediation nor by abiding by the UN Resolutions.

In the wake of changing regional and global dynamics, resolution of the issue has become a top most priority, but unsensitized international community is perhaps waiting for emergence of regional crises out of Kashmir dispute. As global players do not find any interest in resolution of the dispute, it has become a humanitarian issue in the region.

As a matter of fact, Indian authorities are not willing to talk with Kashmiri people on political grounds. New Delhi reached to a conclusion that only bullet is the right way of dealing with Kashmiris, demanding their right of self-determination. Surprisingly, Indian successive governments are trying to ignore the dynamics of the freedom movement of Kashmiris for the sake of their alien rule. 

But, New Delhi is still showing its intransigence in order to resolve Kashmir dispute with Pakistan by neglecting the fact that Kashmir remains a nuclear flashpoint between both the neighbouring countries. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s serious and sincere effort at the annual session of the United Nations in December 2015—the speech of Pakistan’s prime minister and his meeting with the American president, highlighting the Kashmir dispute and demanding its solution has infused a new spirit among the Kashmiri people. 

Nonetheless, by exposing the double standard of the US-led western countries which still remain silent over the Indian injustices, Kashmiris are waging the war of liberation by demanding their legitimate right of self-determination from India which has been strengthening its illegal control on Kashmir.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Pakistan’s Balanced Policy in the Middle East

By Sajjad Shaukat

An article, under the title, “Pakistan—A key GCC ally”‏, published in the “Arab News” on January 15, 2016, written by Abdulrahman Al-Rashed needs appropriate attention.

Abdulrahman mentioned that three million Pakistanis who work in the Gulf countries, and the $4 billion in annual transactions they make, the region considers relations with Pakistan strategic.

He elaborates, “The country is not viewed as a mere trading partner or another Muslim nation. Pakistan has always been considered part of the formula of regional balance with Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.”

He wrote, “Pakistan’s military capabilities qualify it to play a balancing role in the region, whereby it is a deterrent against Iranian expansionism, which has increased following the nuclear deal. Despite tensions, I do not think the situation will deteriorate into military conflict between major regional countries. However, an active Pakistani presence in the Middle East, and particularly in the Gulf region, will provide regional stability and security, and enhance Islamabad’s international influence.”

Abdulrahman said, “Since Pakistan is militarily stronger than its neighbor Iran, with which it shares a 900-kilometer border, Tehran has avoided a confrontation with Islamabad, although it has not stopped inciting sectarian tensions in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

He further wrote, “Iran has been keen to tempt Islamabad by talking of building a gas pipeline through Pakistan—a plan that has always been delayed by regional crises, geopolitical issues and sanctions on Iran that prevented bilateral trade. Even if Tehran implements the plan, Pakistani interests in Arab Gulf countries are huge and have bigger value commercially, politically and religiously.”

He concluded, “Pakistan has played a balancing role with Iran in the Gulf since the 1970s, and its weight increased as Tehran’s threats against Gulf countries increased in the 1980s. Consecutive Pakistani governments have strengthened relations with the Gulf countries. The Gulf countries consider Pakistan a strategic ally, and a provider of regional balance aimed at preventing Iranian unilateralism and chaos.”

Although in his article, Abdulrahman Al-Rashed has pointed out Pakistan’s balancing role in the Middle East, yet he has not taken cognizance of the facts impartially. In other words, he has shown that Islamabad more prefers its relationship with the countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) than Iran.”

In fact, Pakistan has been acting upon a balanced policy in the Middle East, which could be judged in light of some developments.

In this regard, rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran widened in the aftermath of the execution of the prominent Shia religious leader Nimr al-Nimr as part of Riyadh’s executions of 47 persons on terrorism charges, on January 2, this year. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries like Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, including Sudan broke off diplomatic relations with Iran.

The long rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has come to a boiling point, as rulers and religious leaders of both the countries were accusing each other of promoting sectarian divide in the Islamic World on the Shia-Sunni basis, while manipulating Arab-non-Arab differences.

In this respect, on January 5, 2016, the Adviser to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz said before the National Assembly. Pakistan is concerned over recent tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran…the Muslim World faces grave dangers in the situation.”

The statement follows criticism from opposition parties which lashed out at the government in the National Assembly for not coming up with a clear stance on the situation arising out in the region because of the tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran and called for a parliamentary briefing on the issue. Aziz also gave an in-camera briefing to the National Assembly on the Saudi-Iran tensions.

Aziz maintained that Pakistan will continue to play its positive role to ease tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and it advocates unity among the Muslim countries.

For the purpose, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif had visited Saudi Arabia and Iran. They held meetings with their rulers in in a bid to defuse tensions between the two countries. They called for resolution of the crisis through peaceful means in the larger interest of the Muslim world.

According to the ISPR, during the meeting in Riyadh, Gen. Raheel highlighted Pakistan’s perspective on the Middle East situation and pointed out, “Due to the situation in Middle East, the Muslim Ummah is weakening,” and “stressed the need for opening up the communication channel between Saudi Arabia and Iran.”

Speaking to media in Tehran after meeting Iranian President Hasan Rouhani and his cabinet members, the prime minister said Pakistan had achieved success in normalising ties between the two countries in 1997 and also played the same role during tensions between Iran and Iraq.

He said, “Pakistan will appoint a focal person on Saudi-Iran issue and sincere efforts are being done in this regard.”

In his meeting with the Iranian Defence Minister Hosse Dehghan in Islamabad, Gen. Raheel Sharif reiterated that “Pakistan takes Iran as a very important neighbouring Muslim country and the people of Pakistan have a great affinity with their Iranian brothers.” The Iranian defence minister thanked Gen. Raheel and the people of Pakistan for their efforts to bolster regional security.

While, during the trip of Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince and defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman at Islamabad, Pakistan’s prime minister and chief of army staff had assured him to defuse tension between the two brother countries. His visit came just four days after the kingdom’s Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir visited Islamabad. 

It is notable that some media analysts had misinterpreted the statements of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Raheel Sharif that during their interactions with the rulers of Saudi Arabia, they preferred Riyadh over Tehran by reiterating that “the people of Pakistan would always stand with the people of Saudi Arabia against any threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the kingdom.” However, it was not true, as Islamabad decided to play a mediatory role between the two Muslim countries as part of a balanced approach in the Middle East.

It is mentionable that in the recent past, Islamabad refused to send its troops in Syria to fight against the Islamic State group (ISIS) which is Sunni-based militant outfit and wants to oust the Shia-government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Similarly, last year, Riyadh insisted upon Pakistan to send its armed forces in Saudi Arabia and also to join the coalition to conduct aerial strikes on Yemen. Islamabad which did not join the coalition had also refused to dispatch its forces in Saudi Arabia. Instead, Pakistan’s parliament had passed a unanimous resolution which stated, “The war in Yemen is not sectarian in nature, but has the potential of turning into a sectarian conflict which will have critical fallout in the region including Pakistan.” It urged the government “to stay neutral in the Yemen” conflict and called upon “warring factions in Yemen to resolve their differences peacefully through dialogue.”

On December 15, 2015, Saudi Arabia announced a 34-state Sunni-based military alliance to fight the ISIS. The alliance included Islamic states such as Egypt, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Malaysia, and some African states, with a joint operations centre established in Riyadh. The name of Pakistan was also mentioned in the list. Washington immediately welcomed the alliance.

On December 17, 2015, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said that he was surprised to read the news that Saudi Arabia had named Pakistan as part of the alliance.

As already stated that in wake of Iran-Saudi Arabia rift, Pakistan’s National Assembly debated the issue, when Sartaj Aziz informed the Assembly that Pakistan would continue to play its mediatory role between Iran and Saudi Arabia, The Leader of Opposition Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah and other parliamentary leaders had asked the government to refrain from joining the Saudi Arabia-led alliance at the cost of neighboring Iran.

It is of particular attention that the US had planned to spark a civil war between the Sunnis and Shias in wake of war on terror. For the purpose, a study of Rand Corporation, titled ‘US Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11’ was conducted on behalf of the then US Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force. Its report which was released on December 27, 2004 advocated that Sunni-Shia sectarian division should be exploited to promote the US objectives in the Muslim World. The report was first implemented in Iraq.

In 2004, major terror-attacks were carried out against the Shias. Afterwards, a chain of Shia-Sunni clashes started between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis, targeting each other’s mosques and religious leaders through bomb blasts, suicide attacks etc. After Iraq’s experiment, more deadly pattern of sectarian strife and clashes have been conducted in Pakistan. With the tactical assistance of American CIA and Mossad, Indian secret agency RAW have arranged a number of attacks on mosques and religious leaders of Shias and Sunnis through the militant groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jundullah (God’s soldiers). These outfits kidnapped and killed many Iranian nationals in Pakistan including Iranian diplomats. Jundollah conducted several subversive acts in Pakistan’s province of Balochistan and Iranian Sistan-Baluchistan. In this regard, Tehran has directly accused CIA of funding these types of terror attacks.

It is noteworthy that while hinting towards US and Israel, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei had disclosed, “The bloody actions being committed in Iraq, Pakistan and Iran are aimed at creating a division between the Shias and Sunnis…those who carry out these terrorist actions are directly or indirectly foreign agents.”

Pakistan’s leading Ulemas (Religious scholars) of the Shia-Sunni sects, including politicians have repeatedly pointed out that external conspiracies were being hatched to destroy peace in the country though sectarian divide.

Nonetheless, being a responsible country, Pakistan has been implementing a balance policy in the Middle East

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

India is the Second Largest Source of Components Used by the Islamic State to Make Explosives,

By Santanu Chudhury

India was the second largest source of components used by Islamic State to make explosives, according to a recent report.

The London-based Conflict Armament Research, which tracks the supply and use of illegal arms in active conflicts, said it studied the remnants of explosives found in Syria and Iraq and found “most of the detonators, detonating cord, and safety fuses,” used by Islamic State were from Indian companies.

The organization said it found evidence of parts from 51 companies from 20 countries including the U.S., Russia, China, Brazil, Iran, Belgium, Netherlands and Japan.

Turkey led the list as the largest source of parts. From the more than 700 components recovered from the battlefields, there was evidence of supplies from 13 Turkish companies and seven Indian companies.

All the components from India “were legally exported under government-issued licenses from India to entities in Lebanon and Turkey,” the organization said in the report Thursday.

A spokesman for India’s defense ministry declined to comment.

Islamic State fighters have been able to make improvised explosive devices on a quasi-industrial scale, resulting in heavy civilian and military casualties. Explosives are often made from components that are cheap and readily available such as fertilizers and ammonium nitrate.

Conflict Armament Research said it did not find any evidence the countries or companies named in its report sold directly to Islamic State. The companies sold their components with other companies who in turn sold them to smaller commercial entities.

The report noted that Iraq and Turkey have large agricultural and mining sectors where chemicals which can be used to make explosives and components such as detonating cords are used extensively.